







Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the
Descriptiveness of Elementary Propositions
Abstract
According  to  Wittgenstein,  the  elementary  propositions  cannot  be  analysed  into  any  
further  proposition.  In  T.  4.22,  Wittgenstein  speaks  of  names  as  the  constituents  of  the  
elementary proposition. What does he mean by names? He does not mean proper names 
because such names refer to complex things. According to him, “a name means an object” 
(T.  3.203),  “objects  are  simple”  (T.  2.02),  and  the  “analysis  of  propositions  must  bring  
us to the elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination” (T, 
4.221). There is a dispute over the descriptiveness of elementary propositions. The picture 
theory,  accepted  by  the  early  Wittgenstein,  tells  us  that  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  some  
existent  objects  for  a  proposition  to  have  a  meaning.  However,  in  Tractatus,  there  is  no  
exemplification for the elementary propositions and their constituents, i.e. objects. Thus, the 
equation between the states of affairs and the elementary propositions or between objects 
and proper names may turn out to be just a logical equation without any empirical content, 
despite the positivistic reading of Tractatus promoting empiristic interpretation. This paper 
tries  to  show  that  by  drawing  on  the  picture  theory  the  elementary  propositions  should  
describe something in the real world. Nevertheless, since what is depicted by them cannot 
be designated and referred by any ostensive definition, except in the logical sense of word, 




Regarding	the	Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – henceforth Tractatus	–	there	
are some questions concerning the descriptiveness of the elementary proposi-
tions,	with	which	interpreters	of	the	book	have	concerned	themselves.	If	the	
main function of language is to depict reality and all complex propositions are 
reduced	to	the	elementary	propositions,	then	the	latter	should	depict	reality.	
However,	 is	 there	 any	 example	 for	 elementary	 propositions?	How	 can	we	
refer to any state of affairs as depicted by an elementary proposition? Is there 
anything that can be shown as the referent of a name? In Tractatus,	does	object 
just	refer	to	a	logically	supposed	thing	or	its	reference	is	an	observable	thing	
which can be touched in the experience? Which sensible thing is the referent 
of a name and which observation statement can be regarded as an elementary 
proposition?	This	paper	tries	to	find	some	answers	to	these	questions.	It	will	
show	how	can	we	solve	some	inconsistencies	between	Wittgenstein’s	ideas.
Between	different	 readings	of	 the	book,	 the	main	 reading	 that	 connects	 the	
book’s	 content	with	 experimental	 knowledge	was	proposed	by	 the	philoso-





empirically	verifiable.1 It can be regarded as the positivistic interpretation of 























ings,	 it	was	 being	 read	 aloud	 and	 sentence	 by	 sentence	 (Menger,	 1982,	 p.	
86),	but	the	principle	of	verification	is	not	contained	in	Tractatus. It was lat-
er	formulated	by	Wittgenstein,	in	his	discussions	with	Schlick.	It	seems	that	
this	principle,	at	least	among	logical	positivists,	is	under	the	impact	of	their	
reading  of  the  book  and  their  understanding  of  the  picture  theory.  The  ex-
pression of the picture theory in the Tractatus is what has been said about the 





propositions	 related	 to	 certain	 objects,	 represent	 and	describe	 them?	 If	 the	




G.	E.	M.	Anscombe	claimed	 that	 the	best-known	 thesis	of	 the	Tractatus  is  
probably	 the	 nonsensicality	 of	 “metaphysical”	 propositions,	 and	 that	 just	
the	propositions	of	natural	science	are	sayable	(N.	6.53).	She	adds	 that	 the	





The	problem,	strictly	speaking,	is	whether	the	Tractatus is a book written to 





tirely opposing readings of it.2 The metaphysical reading regards it as a work 
containing  some claims  about  the  nature  of  a  language-independent  reality  
and providing a speculative account of the relation between language and the 
independent reality and what is necessary for language to represent the world. 
Most of the early commentators of Tractatus,	notably	Ramsey,	Russell,	Black,	
Anscombe,	Malcolm,	Pears	and	Hacker,	subscribed	to	this	interpretation.	The	
second	reading	is	the	therapeutic	reading,	according	to	which	the	main	goal	
of the book was to unfold a kind of therapeutic strategy. According to this in-
terpretation,	the	metaphysical	pronouncements	of	the	book,	made	from	a	phil-
osophical	perspective,	are	nonsensical,	and	consequently,	this	philosophical	
perspective is an illusion. The prominent advocates of this interpretation are 
Cora	Diamond,	James	Conant,	Tom	Ricketts,	and	Warren	Goldfarb	(McGinn,	
1999,	pp.	491–492).
Marie McGinn puts forward a third interpretation as a synthesis of the two 









that  the  picture  theory  in  the  Tractatus  should  be  regarded  as  a  logical  or  
maybe	a	metaphysical	theory.	Keeping	this	view	in	mind,	the	authors	disa-
gree with the attitude of logical positivism that explicitly gives an empiricist 
interpretation	of	the	picture	theory.	Moreover,	following	this	view,	positivists	
proceed	to	draw	out	the	principle	of	verification.	It	is	felt	that	the	positivistic	
interpretation of the Tractatus can be added to the foregoing readings as the 
fourth	 reading,	and	 it	 can	be	called	 the	empiricist	 reading;	because	 logical	
positivists regarded Wittgenstein as an anti-metaphysical fellow-traveller and 
a	consistent	empiricist.	Under	their	phenomenalistic	and	empiricistic	reading,	





1   
Anscombe	says:	“The	influence	of	the	Tracta-
tus produced	logical	positivism,	whose	main	
doctrine	 is	 ‘verificationism’.”	 (Anscombe,	
1959,	p.	152)	By	considering	Moritz	Schlick’s	
essay,	Meaning and Verification,	 she	 tries	 to	
show  how  logical  positivism  was  generated  
by the Tractatus,	nevertheless	she	thinks	that	
these two philosophies are incompatible.
2   
James  Conant  and  Silver  Bronzo  speak  of  
the	 current	 controversy	 between	 two	 major	
parties  in  interpreting the  book.  The old  and 
traditional reading and the resolute and revo-
lutionary one. And they refer to a third reading 
which  is  somewhere  in  the  middle  between  
those  two  extremes.  Main  proponents  of  the  






Regarding	 the	world,	Wittgenstein	 uses	 some	German	words:	Gegenstand 
(object),	Sachverhalt  (atomic facts3  or  states  of  affairs),4 Tatsache  (facts  or  
situations),	Ding (thing)	and	Sache (entity).5	Concerning	language,	his	words	
are:	Name (name),	Elementarsatz (elementary propositions or sentences)	and	
Satz (propositions).
Some interpreters believe that Wittgenstein takes object  to be equivalent to 
Sache (entity)	or	Ding (thing).	Things is used in the Tractatus only when it is 
combined	with	some	other	things	to	form	atomic	facts	(Morris,	2008,	p.	32).
In	T.	 2.0232	 it	 is	 said,	 implicitly,	 that	 since	 qualities	 disappear	 altogether,	
the	 objects	 have	 no	 qualities;	 nevertheless,	 they	 have	 properties.	Property 
is  used in the book in a broad sense that  covers relations.  These properties 
have	been	divided	into	internal	and	external	properties	(T.	2.01231,	2.0233,	





























Jan	Ludwig	 says	 that	T.	 2.02,	which	 states	 “Objects	 are	 simple.”,	 together	
with	T.	2.021a,	which	states	“Objects	make	up	the	substance	of	the	world.”,	
include	a	claim	that	 lies	at	 the	heart	of	Wittgenstein’s	 logical	atomism	and	











can be interpreted either as an argument on the necessity of world having a 
substance	or	on	the	necessity	of	the	existence	of	simple	objects	that	constitute	
the substance of the world. The accounts of the argument for logical atom-
ism	all	 tend	to	support	 the	latter	 interpretation;	but	 they	need	an	additional	
argument	which	justifies	 the	identification	 of	substance	with	simple	objects	
(Ludwig,	1976,	pp.	307–311).
However,	 there	 are	 some	 differences	 between	 Wittgenstein’s	 remarks	 on	




In	 this	book,	Wittgenstein	presented	a	sort	of	 realistic	view	which	 led	him	

















a	 sign,	 say	name,	 and	 the	 thing	 that	 it	 signifies,	 and	 from	 this,	we	 cannot	




3   
Ogden’s	translation.
4   
Pear’s	&	McGuinnes’s	translation.
5   
David  Weissman  shows  why  he  thinks  that  
“existing	state	of	affairs”	and	“possible	state	
of  affairs”  are  compatible  translations  of   
 
Sachverhalt  and  Tatsache.  He  argues  that  
since Tatsachen  are  only  complexes  (truth  
functions)	of	Sachverhalte	(T.	2.034;	4.2211),	
Sachverhalte  may  be  conceived  as  existing  
atomic	states	of	affairs,	and	because	Tatsachen 
are	described	as	facts	(T.	2),	Sachverhalte	will	
















There are some ideas in the Notebooks	which	confirm	the	realistic	interpreta-





The point is that what has been cited from the Notebooks is not mentioned in 
the Prototractatus and the  Tractatus.	 In	 these	 two	books,	Wittgenstein	says	
that if names had meaning both when combined in propositions and outside 
them	we	cannot	guarantee	that	in	both	cases	they	really	had	the	same	meaning:


































“It	 is,	 therefore,	 impossible	 that	 the	 constituents	 of	 states	 of	 affairs	 for	which	 names	 stand	
should be describable by means of propositions that can be compared with reality for truth or 
falsity;	whatever	is	describable	by	means	of	a	proposition	is	something	that	can	either	exist	or	
fail	to	exist,	namely,	a	state	of	affairs.”	(McGinn,	2007,	p.	212)
Wittgenstein called the constituents of states of affairs which are at the same 
time	constituents	of	the	meaning	of	simple	names,	objects:




does not show a version of realism in which names make a direct link between 
language	and	the	world.	He	says	that	the	object	is	not	something	that	exists	
over  and  against  language  in  an  independent  or  transcendental  realm.  It  is  
what	we	grasp	when	we	grasp	the	meaning	of	the	name,	i.e.	when	we	grasp	
the contribution that the name makes to determine the sense of a class of prop-











refer to some entities like material points and colours as examples of those 




Wittgenstein  used  the  German  term  Elmentarsatz.  The  word Satz	 denotes,	
firstly,	the	idea	of	a	written	or	spoken	declarative	sentence,	and	secondly,	the	
idea  of  the  meaning  or  thought  expressed  in  a  written  or  spoken  sentence.  
Wittgenstein	uses	Satz	 to	 indicate	a	sentence,	or	sentence	type,	as	opposed	
to	the	meaning	of	what	comes	between	sentence	and	fact	(Peterson,	1990,	p.	
192).	In	the	Tractatus and regarding Elmentarsatz,	Wittgenstein	says:
“An	elementary	sentence	consists	of	names.	It	is	a	nexus,	a	concatenation	of	names.”	(T.	4.22)
Here,	Wittgenstein	deals	with	names	that	are	syntactic	entities	and	not	with	




that Tractarian Satz are syntactic entities and are sentences rather than mean-
ings	of	sentences	(Peterson,	1990,	p.	192). The word Elmentarsatz has been 
translated	 by	 some	 interpreters	 as	 “elementary	 proposition”,	 and	 by	 some	
others	as	“elementary	sentences”.6 Although in the ordinary language Satz is 
used	in	both	of	those	meanings,	it	seems	that	the	first	translation	of	the	word	
is better because one of the differences between a proposition and a sentence 
is that the former is often dealt with in logic while the latter in literature. Since 
in the Tractatus	Wittgenstein	would	like	to	be	regarded	as	a	logician,	it	can	be	
said	that,	by	using	the	word,	he	means	“proposition”	rather	than	“sentence”.	
Nevertheless,	 some	 interpreters	 believe	 that	 the	 syntactic	 use	 of	 the	word,	
that	is	“sentence”,	is	more	prevalent	in	Tractatus. The proposition expressed 
in	a	(meaningful	declarative)	sentence	is	the	Sinn,	or	sense,	of	that	sentence;	
hence Wittgenstein has enough tools in Tractatus to draw the distinction when 
he needed it. Different Sätze can have the same Sinn.
In	his	book	on	Wittgenstein,	George	Pitcher	says	that	in	the	Tractatus,	Witt-
genstein  had  used  the  term  Satz	 in	 two	 senses:	 proposition	 and	 sentence.	
When	he	used	it	as	something	capable	of	being	true	or	false	(e.g.	T.	4.06,	4.25	
and	4.26),	he	meant	proposition,	and	when	he	spoke	of	it	as	a	composition	
of	words	(e.g.	T.	3.141),	he	meant	sentence. But it is obvious that his interest 
was	much	more	“in	what	sentences	are	used	to	assert;	i.e.	in	propositions	than	
in	the	sentences	themselves”	(Pitcher,	1964,	pp.	28–30).	Pitcher	tried	to	show	






To	give	 an	 example,	he	 says	 that	 though	 the	proposition	“It	 is	 raining.”	 is	
just	one	proposition,	it	can	be	expressed	by	three	different	sentences	in	three	
different	languages.	He	adds:
“Propositions	 are	 the	 sort	 of	 thing	 that	 can	be	 true	or	 false,	 but	 sentences	 cannot	be	 true	or	























Pitcher	refers	 to	what	Moore	says	 in	“Wittgenstein’s	Lectures	 in	1930–33”	
about	this	subject.7	Moore	says	that	Wittgenstein	“sometimes	explicitly	dis-
tinguished	 sentences	 and	 propositions,	 and	 sometimes	 said	 things	 which	
imply	that	 ̒sentence̕	and	 ̒proposition̕	mean	the	same”	(Moore,	2010,	p.	29).	






proposition	as	generally	understood	 includes	both	 ‘what	 I	 call	proposition,	
also	 hypotheses,	 and	 mathematical	 propositions’.	 The	 distinction	 between	
these	 three	kinds	 is	a	 logical	distinction”	 (Moore,	2010,	p.	261),	and	so	 in	
the	case	of	each	one,	there	must	be	some	grammatical	rules.	Moore	says	that	
Wittgenstein	had	regarded	the	act	of	“giving	an	order”	as	a	proposition	while	




word  that  he  uses  for  simple  things  is  object.	According	 to	 him,	 “a	 name	
means	an	object”	(T.	3.203)	and	“objects	are	simple”	(T.	2.02),	and	“analysis	
of  propositions  must  bring  us  to  elementary  propositions  which  consist  of  
names	in	immediate	combination”	(T.	4.221).
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7   
It	should	be	regarded	that	those	Wittgenstein’s	
lectures are related to the time when some of 
his  views  already  changed.  They  correspond 
to	 the	 later	period	of	his	 thought,	 and	hence	
are  not  to  be  relied  upon  in  reconstructing  
the  theory  of  meaning  contained  in  Tracta-
tus.	 Here,	 we	 are	 merely	 referring	 to	 what	 
 
meanings of these words Wittgenstein had in 
his	mind,	of	course,	in	his	latter	thought.




are	 the	 ontological	 correlates	 of	 names,	 ele-












At	the	beginning	of	the	first	chapter	of	An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Trac-
tatus,	Anscombe	quoted	from	Karl	Popper	his	description	of	the	Tractatus,	in	
which he showed that the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are simple 






for  many years  occured  in  Cambridge  discussions  was  that  the  elementary  
propositions	 are	not	merely	observation	 statements,	 but	 sense-datum	state-
ments.	Anscombe	 then	goes	 to	 reject	 this	 interpretation	of	 the	book	and	 to	
show	that	propositions	like	“This	is	a	red	patch.”	are	not	elementary	proposi-
tions.	After	referring	to	some	words	from	Wittgenstein,	she	argued	that	in	the	




4. Picture Theory of Meaning9
Wittgenstein	 held	 that	 though	 the	 simple	 object	 is	 not	 observable	 and	 the	
combination	of	objects	which	makes	a	state	of	affairs	is	not	as	well,	but	they	
must be there to provide the ultimate foundation for the construction of lan-
guage. The connection between language and reality is made by names and 




The  relation  between  the  Tractatus and  the  picture  theory  of  meaning  has  
been	stated	properly	by	Anscombe	as	follows:























on  the  other.  So  the  function  of  these  concepts  is  an  abstractive  function  
(Grayling,	1988,	pp.	28–32).
According	to	T.	4.024,	a	proposition	is	understood	when	we	know	what	will	
be the case if it was true. The important difference between the meaning of a 
name and the meaning of a proposition is that the meaning of a name depends 
on	the	object	it	names	(T.	3.203),	but	the	meaning	of	a	proposition	depends	
on	the	possibility	of	knowing	that	in	which	situation	it	will	be	true	(T.	4.024).	
It can be concluded that the meaning of a proposition is independent from it 
being	true	or	false	(Pitcher,	1964,	p.	44).
In	contrast	to	Frege,	who	distincted	Sinn from Bedeutung and held that names 
and	sentences	can	have	both	of	them,	Wittgenstein	claimed	that	a	name	has	





pict reality. It does so by elementary propositions depicting possible states of 
affairs–they	manage	to	do	that	by	sharing	the	logical	form	with	the	represent-
ed	states	of	affairs,	i.e.,	being	isomorphic.	A	proposition	must	be	a	picture	of	
a possible situation it depicts whether it was existent or nonexistent. To know 
the	meaning	of	that	proposition,	we	need	to	know	what	situation	it	depicts:
“A	proposition	is	a	picture	of	reality:	for	if	I	understand	a	proposition,	I	know	the	situation	that	
it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me.” 
(T.	4.021)
The word picture (Bild)	is	mentioned	68	times	in	Tractatus and it seems that it 
does	not	have	a	unified	meaning	(words	visual	and	seeing	are	mentioned	only	
9   
Some  of  the  expressions  in  the  Tractatus 




communicates a situation to us and so it must 
be  essentially  connected  with  the  situation.  
And	the	connection	is	precisely	 that	 it	 is	 it’s	
logical	 picture.”	 (T.	 4.03);	 “Instead	 of	 ‘This	
proposition	has	such	and	such	a	sense’	we	can	
simply say ‘This proposition represents such 
and	such	a	situation’.”	(T.	4.031);	“One	name	
stands	for	one	thing,	another	for	another	thing,	
and  they  are  combined  with  one  another.  In  
this  way  the  whole  group-like  a  tableau  vi-
vant-presents	 a	 state	of	 affairs.”	 (T.	4.0311);	
“The	 possibility	 of	 propositions	 is	 based	 on	
the	principle	 that	objects	have	 signs	 as	 their	
representatives.”	(T.	4.0312)
10	   
According  to  the  well-known  interpretation  
of Tractatus,	 it	 represents	 a	 realist	 theory	of	
meaning proposing the idea of direct link be-
tween	bits	of	language	(words)	and	bits	of	the	
world	(objects).	Given	the	view,	language	rep-
resents possible states of affairs and this abil-
ity of language comes from the links between 
individual	expressions	and	objects	which	are	
existent prior and independent from language. 









of a picture in Tractatus,	a	simple	sketch	or	a	doll	model	(N.	7)	and	an	abstract	
(logical)	picture	(T).
However,	what	Wittgenstein	wants	 to	 say	 is	 that	 a	 proposition	 is	 a	 logical	







b)		Each	 feature	 of	 the	 structure	 of	A	must	 correspond	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 the	
structure	of	B.	Wittgenstein	claimed:	“In	a	proposition	there	must	be	ex-










that had been presented before a court in Paris. As that model represented the 
accident	by	the	correspondence	between	the	miniature	houses,	cars,	people,	




The	first	 objection	 is	 that	 it	 is	 incompatible	with	 some	of	his	other	words.	
Because:
“If	a	proposition	is	a	picture	of	a	fact,	then	every	word	or	phrase	in	it	must	directly	stand	for	
something	 […];	 and	 so	 in	 the	proposition	 ‘the	author	of	Waverly	 is	Scotch’,	 the	phrase	 ‘the	
author of Waverly’	must	directly	represent	some	object.	But	according	to	the	theory	of	definite	
descriptions,	accepted	by	Wittgenstein,	this	is	not	the	case.”	(Pitcher,	1964,	p.	80)
Pitcher	 added	 that	 this	 objection	will	 be	 swept	 away	by	Wittgenstein’s	 in-
sistence that only elementary propositions which consist of names are a pic-
ture	of	situations,	and	the	complex	propositions	will	do	 this	when	they	are	






not	 name	 something	 simple	 and	 indestructible.	 It	 is	 a	 definite	 description,	
which	brings	in	the	sentence	a	complex	logical	structure,	when	that	sentence	






















which are linked and make a sentence. So in this way speaking of a proposi-
tion,	a	bundle	of	names	had	been	presupposed	by	him.	At	the	end	of	the	dis-
cussion	about	this	subject,	Pitcher	himself	confesses	that	Wittgenstein	speaks	
of an elementary proposition not as a mere series of names but as a nexus or 
a	connection	of	names	(T.	4.22;	Pitcher,	1964,	p.	83).

















11   
In	addition	to	this,	it	should	be	regarded	that	
picture-theory	 is	 surely	 influenced	 also	 by	
known	concepts	of	picture	by	Schopenhauer,	
and  perhaps  even  more  by  Hertz  and  Boltz-
mann	(Preston,	2017,	p.	111).	This	also	relates	
to	his	concept	of	model	(dynamic	model	too);	
since  Wittgenstein  was  regarding  a  propo-




pointed out that though the Tractatus depends 
on  and  revels  in  Schopenhauerian  transcen-
dentalism,	 but	 in	 the	 post-Tractatus period,	
Wittgenstein  gave  up  transcendentalism  in  












common to all pictures that can represent that state of affairs. The facts repre-
sented by true propositions exist in logical space and are not prior to or inde-






when I talk about this matter. But how am I imaging the simple? Here all I can say is always ‘x 
has	reference’.”	(N.	45,	6.5.15)
 The logical analysis which led Wittgenstein to speak about elementary prop-
ositions	and	simple	objects	was	his	thought	that	if	 there	are	complex	prop-
ositions about real  things whose meanings are based on their  describing or 
representing	possible	facts,	the	descriptiveness	of	this	kind	of	propositions	is	
indirectly and through other complex propositions. The question goes to these 
second	complex	propositions.	If	their	descriptiveness	was	indirect,	we	need	
some third kind of propositions ad infinitum.	In	this	situation,	there	would	be	






complex propositions persuades us to end the process to elementary proposi-
























affairs in a manner their names are concatenated in the considered sentence. 









complex proposition is reduced to the elementary propositions of which it is 
a	compound,	the	difference	is	that	the	denoting	of	the	former	to	the	external	






tions is directly and in the second indirectly and say hypothetically.
6. Conclusion
The challenge discussed in this paper was the inconsistency between the pos-
itivistic  view about  the  Tractatus	 and	Wittgenstein’s	 logical	point	 of	view.	
According to the positivistic view derived from the Tractatus,	only	empirical	
propositions  are  meaningful  because  only  this  kind  of  propositions  depicts  
the reality and other propositions such as metaphysical propositions and reli-
gious propositions have no empirical content. The picture theory of meaning 
that  constitutes  the  core  of  the  Tractatus  says  that  it  is  necessary  to  depict  
something from the  external  world  for  any proposition  to  have  a  meaning.  
Relying	on	this	principle,	positivists	held	that	the	metaphysical	and	religious	
propositions have no meaning and the ethical propositions are expressions of 








that if we accept the Vienna Circle view on the picture theory of meaning and 
the	principle	of	verification	as	they	derived	from	the	Tractatus,	which	requires	
the main function of language to be depicting and representing empirical re-
ality,	we	will	have	problem	with	Wittgenstein’s	objects	which	cannot	be	des-







a logical view that has nothing to do with empirical reality.
It	may	be	objected	that	it	is	quite	obvious	that	the	Tractatus contains	“logical	
and	not	empirical	analysis	of	the	world”;	however,	so	do	the	works	of	the	Vi-








what is problematic and controversial is the relation between the elementary 
propositions which have logical content and the propositions which report the 
observations and contain empirical content. 
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Prema Wittgensteinovu mišljenju, temeljne propozicije ne mogu se analizirati u daljnje propo-
zicije. U T. 4.22, Wittgenstein govori o imenima kao konstituentima temeljnih propozicija. Što 
misli pod imenima? Ne misli vlastita imena jer se takva imena referiraju na kompleksna bića. 
Prema njegovu mišljenju, »ime znači predmet« (T. 3.203), »predmeti su jednostavni« (T. 2.02), 
a »analiza propozicija mora nas dovesti do temeljnih propozicija koje se sastoje od imena u 
izravnoj povezanosti« (T. 4.221). Oko deskriptivnosti temeljnih propozicija vodi se spor. Teo-
rija slike, prihvaćena kod ranog Wittgensteina, govori nam o tome da je nužno referirati se na 
neki izvanjski predmet da bi propozicija imala značenje. Međutim, u Tractatusu,  nema opri-
mjerenja za temeljne propozicije i njihove konstituente, tj. predmete. Stoga, jednadžba između 
stanja stvari i temeljnih propozicija ili između predmeta i vlastitih imena možda je samo logička 
jednadžba bez empirijskog sadržaja, usprkos pozitivističkom čitanju Tractatusa koji promovira 
empirističko tumačenje. Ovaj rad nastoji pokazati da bi, polazeći od teorije slike, temeljne pro-
pozicije trebale opisivati nešto u stvarnom svijetu. Bez obzira na to, budući da ono što je njima 
opisano ne može biti označeno i referirano nikakvom pokaznom definicijom, osim u logičkom 







Nach Wittgensteins Dafürhalten lassen sich aufgrund von Elementarsätzen keine weiteren Sätze 
herausanalysieren. In T. 4.22 redet Wittgenstein von Namen als Bestandteilen der Elementarsätze. 
Was versteht er unter Namen? Er meint keine Eigennamen, weil solche Namen auf komplexe 
Wesen verweisen. Seiner Annahme nach „bedeutet der Name den Gegenstand“ (T. 3.203), „der 
Gegenstand ist einfach“ (T. 2.02) und „bei der Analyse der Sätze müssen wir auf Elementarsätze 
kommen, die aus Namen in unmittelbarer Verbindung bestehen“ (T. 4.221). Über die Deskriptivität 
der Elementarsätze wird ein Disput geführt. Die vom frühen Wittgenstein akzeptierte Theorie 
der Abbildung besagt, dass es geboten ist, sich auf ein bestimmtes äußeres Ding zu beziehen, um 
einem Satz eine Bedeutung zu verleihen. Allerdings gibt es in Tractatus keine Verbeispielung für 
Elementarsätze und deren Bestandteile, d. h. Gegenstände. Dementsprechend ist die Gleichung 
zwischen Sachverhalten und Elementarsätzen oder zwischen Gegenständen und Eigennamen 
trotz einer positivistischen Lesart des Tractatus,  der  einer  empirischen  Deutung  Förderung  
angedeihen lässt, womöglich lediglich eine logische Gleichung ohne empirischen Inhalt. Dieser 
Aufsatz intendiert, darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Elementarsätze, ausgehend von der Theorie der 
Abbildung, etwas in der realen Welt beschreiben sollten. Aber unbeschadet dessen, da jedoch 
das, was von ihnen beschrieben wird, durch keinerlei demonstrative Definition bezeichnet und 
referiert werden kann, außer im logischen Sinne des Wortes, ist die Art und Weise, auf die sie die 







Le Tractatus de Wittgenstein et
le caractère descriptif des propositions élémentaires
Résumé
Selon la pensée de Wittgenstein, les propositions élémentaires ne peuvent être analysées dans 
les propositions suivantes. Dans le T. 4.22, Wittgenstein parle des noms comme des constituants 
des propositions élémentaires. Qu’entend-il sous le terme de nom ? Il ne pense pas aux noms 
propres car de tels noms se réfèrent à des êtres complexes. Selon lui, « le nom signifie l’objet » (T. 
3.203), « l’objet est simple » (T. 2.02), et « par l’analyse des propositions, nous devons parvenir 
à des propositions élémentaires,  qui consistent en noms dans une connexion immédiate » (T. 
4.221). Le caractère descriptif des propositions élémentaires est un sujet de querelle. La théorie 
de  l’image,  acceptée  par  le  jeune  Wittgenstein,  nous  dit  qu’il  est  nécessaire  de  se  référer  à  
un  objet  extérieur  pour  que  la  proposition  ait  un  sens.  Toutefois,  dans  le  Tractatus  il  n’y  a  
pas d’exemplification pour les propositions élémentaires et leurs constituants, à savoir les 
objets. Dès lors, l’équation entre l’état des choses et les propositions élémentaires ou entre les 
objets et les noms propres constitue peut-être seulement une équation sans contenu empirique, 
malgré la lecture positiviste du Tractatus qui met en avant l’interprétation empirique. Ce travail 
s’applique à  montrer  que les  propositions  élémentaires,  en partant  de  la  théorie  de  l’image,  
devraient décrire quelque chose dans le monde réel. Hormis cela, étant donné que ce qui est 
décrit par leur entremise ne peut être signifié et se référer à aucune définition démontrable, 
sauf dans un sens logique, la manière dont ils décrivent le monde et représentent la réalité est 
incertaine et controversée.
Mots-clés
propositions	élémentaires,	propositions	complexes,	objet,	état	des	choses,	nom,	situation
